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Abstract
Philosophers often distinguish between parameter error and model
error. Frigg et al. [2014] argue that the distinction is important because
although there are methods for making predictions given parameter
error and chaos, there are no methods for dealing with model error
and “structural chaos.” However, Frigg et al. [2014] neither define
“structural chaos” nor explain the relationship between it and chaos
(simpliciter). I propose a definition of “structural chaos”, and I explain
two new theorems that show that if a set of models contains a chaotic
function, then the set is structurally chaotic. Finally, I discuss the
relationship between my results and structural stability.
Climate scientists need at least two types of information to generate
forecasts: (1) data about the earth’s current climate and (2) a model that
describes how the climate changes over time. Thus, there are at least two
causes of inaccuracy in climate predictions. First, predictions might may be
inaccurate because current climatic conditions are mismeasured or misesti-
mated. Call this initial conditions error (ice). Alternatively, error may
arise from an inaccurate model of how the climate changes over time. Call
this structural model error (sme).1
The same remarks apply to predictions about any dynamical system.
If one is interested in predicting the evolution of an ecosystem over time
(e.g., how population levels of various organisms change), or the behavior
of markets (e.g. how prices of various commodities change), or how an
epidemic will spread through a city, etc., one needs to identify both the
initial conditions of the system and how the system changes over time. So
there are likewise at least two sources of error in all these problems.2
1This distinction is similar to Parker [2010]’s distinction between parameter and model
uncertainty.
2For a discussion of other sources of error in modeling, see Bradley [2012].
1
In a recent paper, Frigg et al. [2014] argue that the distinction between
sme and ice is crucial for both scientific practice and policy-making. They
claim that, although there are methods that can generate accurate predic-
tions in the presence of both (i) ice and (ii) chaos, there are no known
methods for doing the same with respect to (i’) sme and (ii’) an analo-
gous notion of “structural chaos”, which they call the “hawk-moth” effect.3
For this reason, Frigg et al. [2014] argue that structural chaos and sme are
neglected, but important topics within philosophy of science.
Although they provide an illustrative example and ample computer sim-
ulations to suggest structural chaos might be widespread, Frigg et al. [2014]
do not define “structural chaos” or investigate its relationship to chaos (sim-
pliciter).4 This is important because there are many definitions of “chaos”,
and so there might be many analogous notions of “structural chaos.”5
Frigg et al. [2014]’s arguments, therefore, raises at least three important
questions for philosophers of science, applied mathematicians, and working
scientists. First, for each definition of “chaos”, what is the analogous concept
of structural chaos? Second, what are the relationships among the various
notions of chaos (simpliciter) and the analogous notions of structural chaos?
Finally, what are the implications of structural chaos for prediction, control,
and explanation?
This paper takes a preliminary step with respect to the first two ques-
tions. Section one describes some conditions that are used to define “chaos.”
I focus on topologically mixing systems, which are an important class of
chaotic ones.6 In section two, I define an analogous notion of “structural
mixing” that might be used to characterize structural chaos. I then prove
that, when a sufficiently rich collection of models contains a topologically
mixing function, then the collection is structurally mixing in my sense.
Section three explores the relationship between my results and other
3Similar arguments appear in [Parker, 2011].
4Frigg et al. [2014] do formally define what they call “closeness to goodness fit.” This
definition is analogous the the definition of sensitivity to initial conditions, which is gen-
erally considered to be a necessary but insufficient condition for chaos. See section one
below. At points, they implicitly suggest that structural instability might be the structural
analog to chaos. This suggestion is criticized in the section three.
5For discussions of definitions of chaos, see [Batterman, 1993] and [Werndl, 2009].
6According to Devaney et al. [1989]’s widely-cited definition, a system is chaotic if
it satisfies three conditions: (i) it is sensitive to initial conditions; (ii) it is topologically
transitive, and (iii) its periodic points are dense in state space. Topological mixing systems
are topologically transitive, and under very general conditions, they are also sensitive to
initial conditions. Thus, they satisfy two of the three properties that are widely used to
define “chaos.”
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potential characterizations of structural chaos. In particular, I argue that
definitions of “structural instability”, which are often informally motivated
in ways analogous to definitions of chaos, are not clearly analogous to notions
of chaos simpliciter. The final section discusses the philosophical importance
of my results and answers to the above three questions.
1 Chaos
Popular writings often describe chaos via an appeal to Lorenz’s metaphor
of the “butterfly effect”. Lorenz famously asked whether the flapping of a
butterfly’s wings in Brazil could cause a thunderstorm in Texas. In general,
a chaotic system is often described as one in which small changes (e.g. a
butterfly flapping its wing) in the initial conditions of a system can create
large changes in its behavior (e.g., storm patterns).
This informal gloss captures only one aspect of standard definitions of
“chaos”, however. To give more precise characterizations, it is necessary
to introduce some definitions. A discrete-time dynamical system is a
triple 〈X, d, ϕ〉 where (i) 〈X, d〉 is a metric space called the state space,
and (ii) ϕ : X → X is a time-evolution function.7 For the remainder
of the paper, I use the phrases “model”, “dynamical function” and “time-
evolution function” interchangeably, though of course I recognize not all
models in science are time-evolution functions.
For example, a dynamical system might describe the motion of a parti-
cle in space. In this case, X is be three-dimensional space; d represents a
function specifying the distance between points in three-dimensional space,
and ϕ is a function describing how a particle moves over time. Or X might
be the set of vectors specifying the temperature, pressure, and wind veloc-
ities at different places in the atmosphere; d would represent how similar
two descriptions of the earth’s climate are, and ϕ would represent how the
climate changes over time.
How can one use the definition of a dynamical system to capture the
notion of sensitivity to initial conditions? Let ∆ be a number representing
a large distance between states. What counts as “large” can depend upon
the state space and one’s interests. Say a dynamical system’s behavior is
sensitive to initial conditions to degree ∆ if for every state x ∈ X and
every arbitrarily small distance  > 0, there exists a state y within distance 
of x and a natural number N such that d(ϕN (x), ϕN (y)) > ∆. Here, ϕN (x)
7Note that, for simplicity, I assume that the time evolution function ϕ is constant over
time. Not all discrete dynamical systems have this property.
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represents the state of the system after N stages if its initial conditions were
x. Informally, a system exhibits sensitivity to initial conditions if no matter
the true initial state x, there is an arbitrarily close state y such that, if y
had been the initial state, the future would have been radically different.
This mathematical definition is the natural way of capturing the above
informal description of chaos above, but there are many time-evolution func-
tions that are sensitive to initial conditions in the above sense and yet are
hardly “chaotic” in any sense of the word. Consider, for example, the func-
tion f(x) = 2x on the state space consisting of all real numbers. Then f is
sensitive to initial conditions because if two numbers x and y differ by even
the smallest amount, then the result of multiplying them by two repeatedly
will cause them to drift apart. That is, |fn(x)− fn(y)| = 2n|x− y| becomes
arbitrarily large as n grows. So f is sensitive to initial conditions, but f
does not exhibit “chaotic” behavior in the least.
What other conditions might one add in order to characterize “chaos”? It
turns out there is no wide agreement, and that several different definitions of
chaos are common.8 Because my aim is to show how three types of questions
might be answered (see above), I will not defend a particular analysis of
chaos. Rather, I will simply show how to answer the three questions with
respect to the concept of “topologically mixing”, which plays an important
in characterizing chaos (see footnote 5).
A time-evolution function ϕ is called topologically mixing if for any
pair of non-empty open sets U and V , there exists a number N > 1 such
that
ϕn(U) ∩ V 6= ∅.
for all n ≥ N . In order to reduce the amount of technical jargon, I will say
ϕ is chaotic if it is topologically mixing.
For the reader unfamiliar with topology, ignore the phrase “open set”
for now. Just think of U and V as representing sections of state space. If
the system begins in some state in U , then the expression ϕn(U) represents
all possible future states after n many steps of time. For example, suppose
the dynamical system describes the movement of a gas molecule in a room.
Further, assume that U represents the upper-left quarter of the room and
that V represents the lower-right hand corner. Then ϕn(U) represents the
8For what it’s worth, I agree with Werndl [2009] that the vast majority of systems that
are agreed to be chaotic are strongly mixing in the sense of ergodic theory. Moreover, I
agree with [Berkovitz et al., 2006] that, because strong mixing is one among several logi-
cally related concepts of probabilistic independence in the ergodic hierarchy, it is probably
most productive to think of chaos as coming in degrees, where different degrees may have
different implications for prediction, explanation, and control.
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possible positions of the gas molecule after n many units of time if the gas
particle started in the upper-left quarter of the room. The above equation
says that there is some time in the future such that, from that point onward,
there is always a position in the upper-left corner of the room (U) such that,
if the gas particle had started in that position, then it would end up in the
lower-right quarter of the room (V ). A time-evolution function is chaotic if
this holds for any regions of state space, which is to say that (in the example)
a gas particle that starts in one section of the room can end up in any other
section of the room after a sufficiently large period of time.
If topological mixing is taken to be a characteristic of chaotic systems,
would would it mean to say that smes can lead to “structural chaos”? This
is the topic of the next section.
2 Structural Chaos
A dynamical system is chaotic if, when the time-evolution function is held
fixed, similar initial conditions can have any future. Analogously, a set of
dynamics should be called “structural chaotic” if, when the initial conditions
are held fixed, similar time-evolution functions can produce any future. See
figure below. To rigorously define “structural chaos”, therefore, one needs a
metric to quantify how “close” two time-evolution functions are.
Let XX represent all time-evolution functions for a system with state
space X. Depending upon one’s interests, there are different appropriate
metric quantifying the distance between models (i.e. time-evolution func-
tions). However, clearly there is some relationship between (1) the distance
between two models and (2) the distances between their predicted future
states after one unit of time. If two models entail that a system, starting
in the same initial position, will be in radically different places in a short
amount of time, then the models are substantially different.
One demanding notion of closeness requires that two models are close
precisely if their values are always close. In other words, the distance be-
tween two time-evolution functions is the maximum/supremum distance be-
tween the models after one unit of time, where the maximum is taken over
all possible starting states. In symbols, define:
D(ϕ,ψ) = sup
x∈X
d(ϕ(x), ψ(x)).
Henceforth, I assume that D quantifies the distance between two time-
evolution functions, but the results below hold for a variety of metrics.
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“Structural mixing” should capture the idea that similar models can
produce different trajectories through the state space given the same initial
conditions. To make this idea rigorous, I introduce some notation. For any
 > 0, let B(ϕ) denote all models within distance  of ϕ. Next, for any
natural number n ∈ N and any point x ∈ X, define a map fx,n : P(XX)→
P(X) as follows:
fx,n(Φ) = {ϕn(x) : ϕ ∈ Φ}
where P(X) is the power set of X, i.e., the set of all subsets of X. In other
words, fx,n maps a set of time-evolution functions to the set of points they
reach after n stages if they are initialized to start at x.
Given a set of time-evolution functions Φ ⊆ XX and a particular model
ϕ ∈ Φ, say that Φ is structurally mixing at ϕ if for all x ∈ X, all  > 0
and all non-empty open sets V ⊆ X, there is some N ∈ N such that
fx,n(B(ϕ) ∩ Φ) ∩ V 6= ∅
for all n ≥ N . In other words, small differences between the estimated
model and the true one can lead to divergent predictions even if one correctly
identifies the initial condition. To reduce jargon, I sometimes say a set of
models is structurally chaotic at ϕ if it is structurally mixing.
Topological Mixing Structural Mixing
The concept of structural mixing is the obvious analog of the definition
of topological mixing in the previous section. Clearly, different definitions of
chaos will generalize to different definitions of structural chaos. Nonetheless,
this example suggests a new research program, which consists of three ques-
tions. First, for each definition of “chaotic system”, what is the analogous
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concept of structural chaos? Second, what is the relationship between the
various notions of chaos (simpliciter) and the analogous notions of structural
chaos? Finally, what are the implications of structural chaos for prediction,
control, and explanation?
Given my definition of structural chaos, the second question can be given
a precise answer:9
Theorem 1 Suppose ϕ is continuous and topologically mixing. If X has no
isolated points, then XX is structurally mixing at ϕ.
That is, the set of possible time-evolution functions is structurally chaotic
if it contains a chaotic model. One might object that this theorem is very
weak. According to the theorem, one should worry about structurally chaos
if every time-evolution function were a plausible description of the dynamics
of the system. However, in practice, the set of plausible models is much
narrower given existing data, domain knowledge, physical constraints, and
so on. For example, if it were 40◦C in Demascus today, then it would be
bizarre if it snowed tomorrow. However, one possible time-evolution function
for Demascus’ weather will entail that a 40◦C day will be followed by a
snowy day. Thus, one might object that if the class of models is restricted
to realistic time-evolution functions, then structural chaos will be rarer.
However, the proof of the above theorem actually shows something much
stronger. It shows that, if the true time-evolution function is chaotic and
the set of possible time-evolution functions contains all models that are
empirically indistinguishable from the true one, then structural chaos will
arise. To explain why, I introduce some definitions.
Data sets are always finite. So let F = {x0, . . . , xn} by a finite set of
states, which represents the observed history of the system so far. Let  > 0
be a small number representing the precision of one’s measurement devices.
Say two models are F -indistinguishable if (1) the values of time-evolution
functions are equal for all but finitely many states outside F and (2) the
two models are no more than  apart according to D.
Two models are F -indistinguishable if they are, in a very strong sense,
indistinguishable given all available empirical data. Why? The first clause
entails that the two models are equal on all observed data points, and so
there is no way that past data alone can distinguish between them. If two
models differ anywhere, however, then there are logically possible exper-
iments that can distinguish between them. Namely, if controlled experi-
ments are financially, pragmatically and ethically feasible (which they often
9See appendix for a proof.
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are not), one can initialize the system to one of the states at which the two
models differ and observe the results.
This is where the second clause kicks in. Suppose scientists’ measuring
instruments and statistical techniques cannot guarantee estimates of the
observed states with accuracy better than  > 0. If two models are F -
indistiguishable, then second clause guarantees that no information about
the current or next state of the system is sufficient to distinguish the models.
One might object that small measurement errors are detectable in the long
run, especially if the model is chaotic. However, if the true dynamics are
continuous and  is sufficiently small, then the second clause entails that no
experiment of a feasible length (i.e. time) will distinguish between it and an
F -indistinguishable model.
The previous discussion motivates the following definition. Let F denote
the finite set of observed states. Say a set Φ of time-evolution functions is
closed under empirical-indistinguishability if there exists some  > 0
such that if ϕ ∈ Φ and ψ is F -indistinguishable from ϕ, then ψ ∈ Φ. The
above argument is intended to show that, if scientists are strict empiricists,
then the set of models that they consider possible ought to be closed under
empirical indistinguishability. Theorem 1 is a special case of the following
stronger result.
Theorem 2 Suppose ϕ is continuous and chaotic. Let Φ be a set of time-
evolution functions containing ϕ. If X has no isolated points and Φ is closed
under empirical indistinguishability, then Φ is structurally chaotic at ϕ.
3 Structural Stability: Conclusions and Future Re-
search
Readers familiar with chaos theory may find the previous theorem surprising.
On one hand, my definition of “structural chaos” seems to formalize the
idea that small errors in identifying the model can lead to divergent future
behavior. On the other hand, many of the time-evolution functions that lead
to “structural chaos” (according to my definition) are structurally stable in
one or more senses.10 This is counter-intuitive because structural stability
10Suppose f : A → A and g : B → B are functions on topological spaces. Then f and
g are said to be topologically conjugate if there is a homeomorphism h : A→ B such that
g ◦ h = h ◦ f . A function f : A → A is Cr structurally stable if there is some  > 0 such
that every function within distance  of f in the Cr metric is topologically conjugate to f .
Cr structural stability is perhaps the most common definition, but other definitions have
a similar logical form, which is discussed in the body of the paper.
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is intended to formalize the idea that small changes to the model do not
result in large differences in the model’s trajectory.
It is best to begin with an example to understand the tension. A paradig-
matic chaotic function is the logistic map Fr(x) = rx(1 − x), where r is
greater than about 3.57. It is known that the logistic map is C2-structurally
stable when r > 4, and it is structurally stable on an open dense set of values
of r between 0 and 4. For this reason, some chaos theorists might claim that
small changes to the logistic map will not result in divergent future behavior.
However, the logistic map (for r = 4) is precisely the example that Frigg
et al. [2014] use to demonstrate the impacts of structural chaos. Moreover,
if Φ is a set of models that contains the logistic map and is closed under
empirical-indistinguishability, then Theorem 2 entails that Φ is structurally
chaotic at the logistic map, as the logistic map is topologically mixing. So
Frigg et al. [2014]’s and my results seem to be in tension with facts about
structural stability.
One possible reason for the tension is that definitions of structural sta-
bility almost always assume that the set of models under investigation are
well-behaved, in the sense that models are differentiable (perhaps several
times) and hence, continuous. In contrast, in order to demonstrate the exis-
tence of “structural chaos” in computer simulations, Frigg et al. [2014] sim-
ulate discretized functions that are, by necessity, discontinuous. Moreover,
if a set of models is closed under empirical indistinguishability in my sense,
it will contain discontinuous functions and other “poorly behaved” models.
Some may see this as a deficiency in Frigg’s and my arguments. Continuity
and differentiability are mathematically convenient assumptions, and Ock-
ham’s razor or other metaphysical arguments might lead one to accept that
the dynamics of real physical systems are continuous. Nonetheless, conve-
nience and simplicity are extra-empirical considerations; a finite sequence
of observed states may be consistent with assuming the continuity of the
system’s time-evolution function, but it does not require doing so. Further-
more, many metaphysical arguments for continuity do not obviously extend
to showing that a function is twice differentiable.
However, I will not defend the thesis that physical laws might be discon-
tinuous or non-differentiable. Rather, I discuss the relation between struc-
tural chaos (in my sense) and various notions of structural stability in order
to illustrate a broader point. Mathematicians, scientists, and philosophers
have yet to investigate whether plausible structural analogs of “chaos” are
actually in tension with definitions of structural stability. My results show
that there may, in fact, be no direct logical inconsistency, and that inconsis-
tency may only arise when additional, substantive assumptions (e.g. conti-
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nuity or differentiability) about the dynamics of the system are introduced.
There are two further reasons to question whether standard definitions
of “structural instability” are really the appropriate dynamical analogs of
chaos. To understand the two reasons, it is not necessary to review all
existing definitions of structural stability. Rather, it suffices to describe
their common logical form [Pugh and Peixoto, 2008]. Namely, given some
equivalence relation R (e.g., topological conjugacy) over functions, one says
a function f is structurally stable if all “close” functions (under some metric)
are R-equivalent to f . Why are definitions of this form not analogous to
characterizations of chaos (simpliciter)?
First, the concepts employed to define structural stability are disjoint
from those used to define chaos. For example, definitions of structural
stability typically use the notions of homeomorphism and diffeomorphism,
whereas definitions of chaos employ notions like sensitivity to initial con-
ditions, topological transitivity, density, etc. Of course, some difference in
definitions is unavoidable, as structural stability is about small changes in
time-evolution functions, whereas chaos is about small changes in states.
Nonetheless, if Werndl [2009] and Berkovitz et al. [2006] are correct, then
probability is a key concept in characterizing degrees of chaos. In contrast,
none of the definitions of structural stability employ probability at all. This
is surprising, given that probability (and in particular, probabilistic inde-
pendence) is perhaps the most widely-employed tool used to characterize
uncertainty, noise, and (expected) error. The fact that probability is not
used in definitions of structural stability, therefore, raises serious questions
about the importance of such definitions for discussions of prediction, con-
trol, and explanation.11
Second, time plays different roles in definitions of chaos and structural
stability respectively. Definitions of chaos typically contain a clause – like
the definition of topological mixing – that places constraints on the distant
future of the system. For example, in many chaotic systems, nearby initial
conditions may have similar trajectories for a long period of time, but their
trajectories may diverge suddenly and radically in the distant future. The
potential for such sudden divergence is what renders long-term predictions
problematic. In contrast, to my knowledge, all but one of the equivalence
relations used to define structural stability constrain only one time step in
the evolution of a dynamical system, and the one exception is typically only
11The reader will note that my definition of structural mixing likewise does not employ
the use of probability. It turns out that the standard notion of topological mixing is closely
related the ergodic (and hence, probabilistic) concept of strong mixing. I conjecture an
analogous relationship will hold in the structural case, but this remains to be shown.
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applied to dynamical systems that are described by differential equations.
These two reasons do not provide conclusive evidence that the math-
ematically rich research on structural stability is, at the end of the day,
unimportant for empirical science. Rather, they suggest two more questions
to add to the list at the outset of the paper: what are the relationships
among various definitions of chaos and structural stability? And what is
the importance of the various notions of structural stability for prediction,
control, and explanation?
4 Conclusions and Philosophical Upshots
Section one outlined a broad research program, which consisted of three
questions. Section two provided a brief example of how one might go about
answering two of three questions. In particular, I defined a notion of “struc-
tural mixing” that is analogous to the standard notion of “topological mix-
ing”, and I proved a theorem relating the two concepts. I now conclude by
discussing philosophical significance of this research program.
To see why this seemingly technical series of questions has broad philo-
sophical importance, replace every occurrence of the phrase “time-evolution
function” with the word “regularity” in the above discussion of structural
chaos and in the two theorems. Doing so reveals that the main result roughly
asserts that there are many “similar” regularities that (i) produce widely
different future behavior and (ii) are compatible with the observed past.
That’s just an instance of the problem of induction. So investigating struc-
tural chaos amounts to investigating (in a mathematically precise setting) a
(the?) central problem of epistemology and philosophy of science.
With this in mind, it is now easy to see why answers to each of the
three questions are philosophically important. Question one asks, “For each
definition of “chaotic system”, what is the analogous concept of structural
chaos?” Because there are different “degrees” of chaos [Berkovitz et al.,
2006], an answer to question one would characterize differing “degrees” of
problem of induction.12 That is, an answer to the first question would allow
one to characterize inductive problems in terms of their difficulty.
Question two asks, “what are the relationships among the various notions
of chaos (simpliciter) and the analogous notions of structural chaos?” To see
12Kelly [1996] contains a sophisticated description of a hierarchy of “problems” of in-
duction. I am skeptical there is any relationship between Kelly’s hierarchy and that which
would arise from pursuing the first question here. So this project would provide an inde-
pendent, orthogonal way of characterizing inductive difficulty.
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why this question is important, it is useful to consider one reason why chaotic
systems are so interesting. The classic problem of induction shows that past
observations are insufficient to identify a dynamical system’s time-evolution
function, and hence, there are many regularities that (a) are compatible with
past observations and (b) predict radically different futures. The existence of
chaos entails that predicting or manipulating a dynamical system’s behavior
might be difficult even if the exact dynamics of the system are known. Hence,
an answer to question two provides a bridge between research on the classical
problem of induction and new research in chaos theory, which respectively
identify different sources of difficulty for prediction and manipulation.
Finally, question three asks, “what are the implications of structural
chaos for prediction, control, and explanation?” The importance of this
question is self-explanatory: prediction, control, and explanation are three
central goals of science, and so an answer to question three amounts to an
answer to the question, “Why is structural chaos important?”
A Proofs
Lemma 1 Let X be any metric space, U ⊆ X an open set and F ⊆ X
be finite. Then U \ F is open. If X be has no isolated points, U \ F is
non-empty.
Theorem 2 Suppose ϕ is continuous and topologically mixing. Suppose
that ϕ ∈ Φ and that Φ is closed under F -indistinguishability for some finite
F ⊆ X. If X has no isolated points, then Φ is structurally mixing at ϕ.
Proof: Let x0 ∈ X. It must be shown that for all  > 0 and all non-empty
open sets V ⊆ X, there is some N ∈ N such that
fx0,n(B(ϕ) ∩ Φ) ∩ V 6= ∅ for all n ≥ N
Call this condition †(, V,N). Let  > 0 and V ⊆ X be an open set.
Define xj = ϕ
j(x0) for all natural numbers j, and let M = |F | + 1.
Because Φ is closed under F -indistiguishability, there is β > 0 such that if
(a) ϕ and ψ agree everywhere on all but finitely many elements of X \ F
and (b) D(ϕ,ψ) < β, then ψ ∈ Φ. As ϕ is continuous and F is finite, it
follows that for all k ≤M there is δk > 0 such that
Bδk(xk) ∩ F =
{ {xk} if xk ∈ F
∅ otherwise.
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and
y ∈ Bδk(xk)⇒ d(ϕ(y), ϕ(xk)) < {, β}
Note here I am using Bγ(z) to refer to the γ-ball around z ∈ X with respect
to the metric d, in the same way that I have used Bγ(ϕ) to refer to the
γ-ball around ϕ with respect to D.
Let δ = min{δk : k ≤ M}. Because ϕ is topologically mixing, for each
k ≤M there is Nk ∈ N such that for all n ≥ Nk:
ϕn(Bδ(xk)) ∩ V 6= ∅
Let N∗ = M + max{Nk : k ≤M}. I claim that †(, V,N∗). Let n ≥ N∗.
It is necessary to find a function ψ ∈ B(ϕ) ∩ Φ such that ψn(x0) ∈ V . If
ϕn(x0) ∈ V , then we’re done. So assume ϕn(x0) 6∈ V .
Because M > |F |, there is k ≤M such that xk 6∈ F . Notice
n− k ≥ N∗ −M ≥ max{Nj : j ≤M} ≥ Nk.
Hence, by choices of δ and N∗, there is y ∈ Bδ(xk) such that ϕn−k(y) ∈ V .
Note y 6= xk because ϕn−k(xk) = ϕn(x0) 6∈ V . I claim that y may be chosen
so that ϕj(y) 6= xk for all j ≤ n− k.
Why? Suppose for the sake of contradiction that for all y ∈ Bδ(xk),
there is some j ≤ (n − k) such that ϕj(y) = xk. In particular, there is
j0 ≤ (n − k) such that ϕj0(xk) = xk. Thus, for all m ≥ (n − k) and all
y ∈ Bδ(xk):
ϕm(y) ∈ {xk, ϕ(xk), . . . , ϕj0−1(xk)}.
Let T = X \ {xk, ϕ(xk), . . . , ϕj0−1(xk)}. Then T is non-empty and open by
the lemma. However, by the above reasoning, ϕm(Bδ(xk)) ∩ T = ∅ for all
m ≥ (n− k). So ϕ is not topologically mixing, contradicting assumption.
It has been shown that y ∈ Bδ(xk) may be chosen so that ϕj(y) 6= xk
for all j ≤ (n− k). Define ψ : X → X as follows:
ψ(z) =
{
ϕ(y) if z = xk
ϕ(z) otherwise.
NoteD(ϕ,ψ) = d(ϕ(xk), ϕ(y)). By continuity of ϕ, it follows that d(ϕ(xk), ϕ(y)) ≤
min{β, }. Hence, ψ ∈ B(ϕ). Because ψ is equal to ϕ everywhere except
xk 6∈ F , it follows that ψ is βF -indistinguishable from ϕ. As Φ is closed
under βF -indistinguishability, ψ ∈ Φ.
Finally, ψn(x) = ϕn−k(y) ∈ V because ϕj(y) 6= xk for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n− k.

13
References
Robert W. Batterman. Defining chaos. Philosophy of Science, 60(1):43—66,
March 1993.
Joseph Berkovitz, Roman Frigg, and Fred Kronz. The ergodic hierarchy,
randomness and hamiltonian chaos. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 37
(4):661–691, 2006.
Seamus Bradley. Scientific uncertainty: A user’s guide. Grantham
Institute on Climate Change, Discussion Paper 56, 2012. URL
http://philpapers.org/rec/BRASUA.
Robert L. Devaney, Luke Devaney, and Luke Devaney. An introduction to
chaotic dynamical systems, volume 6. Addison-Wesley Reading, 1989.
Roman Frigg, Seamus Bradley, Hailiang Du, and Leonard A. Smith.
Laplaces demon and the adventures of his apprentices. Philosophy of
Science, 81(1):31—59, 2014.
Kevin T Kelly. The logic of reliable inquiry. Oxford University Press, New
York, 1996.
Wendy S. Parker. Predicting weather and climate: Uncertainty, ensem-
bles and probability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part
B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 41(3):263–272,
2010.
Wendy S. Parker. When climate models agree: The significance of robust
model predictions. Philosophy of Science, 78(4):579–600, 2011.
Charles Pugh and Mauricio Peixoto. Structural stability. Scholarpedia,
3(9), 2008. ISSN 1941-6016. doi: 10.4249/scholarpedia.4008. URL
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Structural stability.
Charlotte Werndl. What are the new implications of chaos for unpredictabil-
ity? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60(1):195–220,
2009.
14
